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Abstract
Cooperation played a significant role in the self-organization and evolution of living organisms. Both network topology and
the initial position of cooperators heavily affect the cooperation of social dilemma games. We developed a novel simulation
program package, called ‘NetworGame’, which is able to simulate any type of social dilemma games on any model, or real
world networks with any assignment of initial cooperation or defection strategies to network nodes. The ability of initially
defecting single nodes to break overall cooperation was called as ‘game centrality’. The efficiency of this measure was
verified on well-known social networks, and was extended to ‘protein games’, i.e. the simulation of cooperation between
proteins, or their amino acids. Hubs and in particular, party hubs of yeast protein-protein interaction networks had a large
influence to convert the cooperation of other nodes to defection. Simulations on methionyl-tRNA synthetase protein
structure network indicated an increased influence of nodes belonging to intra-protein signaling pathways on breaking
cooperation. The efficiency of single, initially defecting nodes to convert the cooperation of other nodes to defection in
social dilemma games may be an important measure to predict the importance of nodes in the integration and regulation
of complex systems. Game centrality may help to design more efficient interventions to cellular networks (in forms of
drugs), to ecosystems and social networks.
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Introduction
Cooperation is necessary for the emergence of complex,
hierarchical biological organisms. Prisoner’s dilemma and hawk-
dove games are social dilemma games played by agent-pairs
having two strategies: cooperation or defection. These games are
excellent models to elucidate the appearance of cooperation in
situations, when agents generally prefer defection. Such situations
are prevalent in evolutionary biology, where personal interests
often confront with collective interests [1,2]. Recent reports
defined ‘signaling games’ [3–6] or ‘protein games’ [7–9]. In
protein games the applicability of social games was extended to
protein-protein interaction networks, where cooperation level of
the whole system helped to assess the overall integration of
network functions. Here we extend these ideas further, and show
the applicability of the spatial game concept to protein structure
networks (also called residue interaction networks) having amino
acids as their nodes.
In spatial games only those agents are playing with each other,
who are neighbors in the underlying contact network. The level of
cooperation is very sensitive to the topology of the agent network
in a wide variety of social dilemma type games. Cooperation levels
in square lattice, small world and scale-free network topologies
have been widely assessed [10–17]. However, only a few studies
were performed on real world networks [18,19] and even less
studies examined the effects of pre-set starting cooperative and
defective strategies on the development of cooperation at the
network level [20,21]. Although, there are a number of spatial
game-related programs [22–25], but none of them is able to
simulate social dilemma games on real world networks with pre-set
initial strategies.
Following our conference report on an initial version of the
program [26], here we introduce the improved version of a freely
available simulation tool, called NetworGame able to simulate
two-player, pairwise interacting social dilemma games on real
world networks with any assignment of initial cooperation or
defection strategies to network nodes. A novel dynamic centrality,
called game centrality, is also defined, which measures the ability
of individually defecting nodes to convert others to their strategy.
We show the applicability of game centrality on social, protein-
protein interaction and protein structure networks, and highlight
the importance of hubs in the maintenance of cooperation in
complex biological systems.
Results
NetworGame Program for Simulation of Spatial Games
on Any Real-world Networks
Our novel NetworGame 2.0 program package is a cross-
platform, generic tool to simulate repeated spatial games. This
simulation program includes i.) options for pay-off matrices of any
symmetric normal form games (with 2 strategies); ii.) well-known,
replicator-type strategy update rules (best takes over, Fermi-rule
and proportional update [13]), as well as the option for additional,
user-defined strategy update rules in a ‘plugin’-type format; iii.)
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synchronous, and semi-synchronous updating [27]; iv.) and the
option for the inclusion of any real world networks in a Pajek [28]
format (for the description of the simulation steps see Text S1).
The program allows setting the starting strategy of any nodes
according to the wish of the experimenter, and introduces the
novel use of edge weights by considering edge weights as
probabilities of the game played between the corresponding
nodes. A brief description of the NetworGame 2.0 software is
given in the Methods section, a more detailed description
containing the pseudocode of the algorithm used is found in the
Electronic (Text S1). The program with a User Guide is freely
available from our website: www.linkgroup.hu/NetworGame.php.
Definition of Game Centrality as a Relative Importance of
Nodes to Maintain Cooperation
Keeping in mind the relative scarcity of dynamic centrality
measures [29–33] we defined a novel dynamic centrality, called
game centrality, as follows. Initially let all nodes but node i
cooperate, while set the initial strategy of node i to defect. Under
these initial conditions the game centrality of a node i (GCi) is
equal to the proportion of defectors averaged over the last 50
simulation steps.
In the determination of the simulation step range of the
averaging process we considered two opposing effects. 1.)
Averaging over a large number of steps resulted in more accurate
results. 2.) However, averaging more game rounds also hindered
convergence of the mean game centrality value, which determined
the number of total rounds of the repeated game as described in
the next paragraph. As we will discuss in the following paragraphs,
game centrality (GC) is a relative measure useful for the
comparison of the nodes in the same network. Therefore, GC
may also be calculated and compared using more or less steps of
average than 50. However, the selection of the last 50 game
rounds as the ‘average-window’ avoided both potential pitfalls.
Game centrality values depend on the number of time steps
(game rounds) and the number of parallel simulations. We may
minimize GC-variability by measuring the proportion of defectors,
where already no large fluctuations can be seen. This condition
can be reached most of the times by using prisoner’s dilemma
game on real world networks (but can not be reached using e.g. the
evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice [11]).
Ensuring this condition, in the simulations of this paper the
repeated rounds of serial games were concluded, when the mean
value of GC changed less than 0.01 (called as GC-drift threshold)
in the last 50 rounds. Small fluctuations caused by the stochasticity
of some strategy update rules (e.g. replicator dynamics) and by the
occasional stochasticity of edge weights (i.e. using the edge weights
as update probabilities) may be minimized by averaging several
simulations. The number of simulations was chosen to ensure that
the mean error for the proportion of defectors was below 0.01 in
the final step (called as GC-fluctuation threshold). As noted earlier,
GC is used for the comparison of nodes. Therefore, both the GC-
drift and GC-fluctuation thresholds may be set different than 0.01.
However, selection of the threshold value 0.01 resulted in enough
rounds of game simulations to surpass the initial transitional phase,
often observed in repeated games, and resulted in relatively stable
game centrality values. We note that the NetworGame simulation
program can also be set to run simulations having a user-defined,
pre-set number of game rounds.
It is important to note that numerical values of GC also depend
on the payoff conditions and payoff parameters of the actual game
model, on the applied strategy update rule, on the synchronicity of
the update, as well as on the network structure. These features,
together with those mentioned earlier, make GC a relative
measure for the comparison of nodes in the same network using
the same game conditions. Additionally, we found that the ranking
of node GC-s largely correlated for different strategy update rules
and temptation values for the relatively large yeast protein-protein
interaction network studied (having 2,444 nodes and 6,271 edges;
see data later). In this sense GC may also be used for a rough
comparison of node importance to break cooperation using
different game conditions.
In the current simulations we chose the canonical prisoner’s
dilemma game with the payoff parameters R = 3, T = 6, S = 0,
P = 1 (except for Michael’s strike network, where the temptation
value was less: T = 3.1), since selection of the maximal temptation
(T) value ensured the largest sensitivity of the initially almost fully
cooperating network to the defection of a single node. Simulations
used the widely applied best takes over strategy update rule with
synchronous update.
Game Centrality Identifies Influential Members of
Zachary’s Karate Club Network
Wayne Zachary [34] recorded the strength of contacts between
members of a university karate club between 1970 and 1972.
Meanwhile, the club had a dispute between the club president and
the chief karate instructor, leading to a fission resulting in two
separate clubs, which made this social network a gold standard for
network modularization studies. To determine the most influential
members of the karate club using the game centrality measure
(GC) defined above, we simulated a prisoner’s dilemma game on
the Zachary karate club network with the initial cooperation of
every node except the examined, defective club member. Nodes
#3 and #33, as well as #1, #2 and #34 had the top GC values
having equal GC values within the first and second group of nodes
and decreasing GC in the second group as compared to that of the
first group. Node #1 corresponded to the instructor, while node
#34 represented the club president. The large efficiency of these
two and the other 3 nodes to break cooperation is related to the
fact that the 5 nodes listed above had the five highest degrees in
the network, and they were also found among the seven nodes
having the largest betweenness centrality values (node ID-s in the
order of decreasing centralities: #1, #34, #33, #3, #32, #9,
#2).
Game Centrality Measures Identify Influential Member-
pairs of Michael’s Strike Network
As a next step, we were interested, whether the game centrality
of edges (i.e. the average proportion of defectors in the last 50
rounds, where not only a single node, but two neighboring nodes
are both initial defectors) is also giving meaningful results.
Michael’s strike network [35] was an excellent example to test
this measure. Judd H. Michael described a strike in a forest
product manufacturing factory. The factory had a new manage-
ment, who wanted to change the compensation package of the
workers. The two union negotiators (Sam and Wendle) were
responsible for explaining the changes, but they failed to do so,
and a strike broke out. The company hired Judd H. Michael to
make a sociogram, which showed that there were three worker
groups: younger, English-speaking, older, English-speaking, and
younger, Spanish-speaking workers. Sam and Wendle formed a
linked pair of nodes. Judd H. Michael advised to contact another
linked pair of nodes, Bob and Norm – who were at the overlap of
the three communities of the factory sociogram (see Figure S1 of
Text S1) –, and to convince them about the changes. By following
this strategy, the management solved the problem soon, and the
strike ended.
NetworGame: Node Influence to Break Cooperation
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In the social dilemma game simulations of the situation we
considered strikers as cooperators and strike-breakers as defectors
in canonical prisoner’s dilemma games having the payoff
parameters of R = 3, T = 3.1, S = 0, P = 1. Initially everybody
was cooperating, but the two linked workers chosen to explain the
changes to the others. In repeated simulations the influence of
different negotiator-pairs was compared. Simulation of the choice
of Bob and Norm showed that they could convince everybody to
stop the strike in 100% of the simulations. Simulation of the choice
of Sam and Wendle led to the poor result of convincing the others
to stop the strike in 8% of the simulations with the same settings,
which corresponds well with outcome of the real-world events [35]
(we got the same results for the weak prisoner’s dilemma game;
data not shown). Our results show, that not only node game
centrality, but also edge game centrality is giving a similar
outcome than those happened in real-world situations.
Game Centrality Correlates with Former Centrality
Measures and Reveals Novel Centers of Influence in
Protein-protein Interaction Networks
As two proteins approach each other, they signal their status to
the other via the hydrogen-bonded network of water molecules.
Binding is achieved by a complex set of consecutive conforma-
tional adjustments. These concerted, conditional steps were called
as a ‘protein dance’, and can be perceived as rounds of a repeated
game [6–9]. Here we used the canonical prisoner’s dilemma game
with a maximal temptation value (T = 6), since these parameters
represent the most stringent conditions of cooperation among the
most commonly used social dilemma games.
First we examined the effect of defection of party and date hubs
on the cooperation of the high-fidelity yeast (Saccharomyces cerevisiae)
protein-protein interaction network (interactome) of Ekman et al.
[36] using the canonical prisoner’s dilemma game. Party hubs are
hubs, which do not change their neighborhood structure, and are
often situated in the middle of network modules. On the contrary,
date hubs change their neighbors frequently, and often connect
various modules of the interactome. The best distinction between
party hubs and date hubs has been a subject of recent discussions
[37–43]. Prisoner’s dilemma game simulations confirmed the
differences between the two types of hubs. In the simulations
initially we let all the 2,444 nodes cooperate except for 30 nodes,
which defected. We compared the average game centrality values
over 2000 simulations by random sampling 30 defecting nodes
from the 63 consensus party hubs (compiled as in [43], see Table
S1 of Text S1), or from the 145 consensus date hubs (compiled as
in [43], see Table S2 of Text S1), or from all the 2,444 nodes,
respectively. Party hubs had the largest game centrality, while date
hubs and randomly selected node sets had smaller and smaller
game centrality values, i.e. they distorted less and less the initial
cooperation (Table 1). Using the chi-square test we found that the
distribution of game centralities were significantly different
(x2.400) for the different test cases.
Next, we determined the correlation between degrees, between-
ness centralities and GC-s in prisoner’s dilemma games of the
2,444 yeast proteins of the high fidelity yeast interactome [36].
Since both degree and betweenness centrality had a large number
of tied values, we used the Goodman-Kruskal gamma test to test
the association and significance of the results. Using canonical
prisoner’s dilemma game we found that GC has a good correlation
with both degrees and betweenness centralities (Table 2). We
were also curious, which of the 3 measures of degree, betweenness
centrality or game centrality predicts better the phenotypic
potential of yeast protein describing their ‘buffering capacity’
against evolutionary changes, i.e. the contribution of an individual
yeast protein to the overall robustness of yeast cells [44]. GCs were
found to be significantly (p,0.062) better predictors of genetic
buffering of evolutionary changes than either degrees or betwen-
ness centralities (Table 2).
The functional analysis of the 171 proteins of the high-fidelity
yeast interactome [36] causing the final cooperation level to fall
from the starting value of close to 1.0 to less than 0.9 showed the
overrepresentation (p,0.001) of nucleus-related functions (35%).
The second and third most overrepresented classes were signaling-
and transport-related functions (33% and 32%, respectively;
Figure 1). These results were in compliance with the central
position of the nucleus in the structure, organization and dynamics
of the cell. Similarly, transport and signaling are central in both
internal and external cellular communication.
In conclusion, game centrality observed in prisoner’s dilemma
games of nodes in a yeast protein-protein interaction network (i.e.
in a ‘protein game’) offered a novel characterization of the
importance of proteins in complex cellular functions highlighting
the importance of intra-modular party hubs to maintain cooper-
ation.
As we said before, game centrality is a comparative measure
within a network having set a game type, strategy update rule,
temptation value and synchronicity. To assess the consistency of
game centrality ranking, we ran multiple experiments with
different temptation values (T = 3.1, 4, 5 and 6) and/or the
strategy update rules (best-takes-over and Fermi-rule) for the yeast
interactome network. We evaluated the pair-wise correlation
(Goodman-Kruskal gamma) between the game centralities for the
case of small (3.1 and 4.0) and large temptation values (5.0 and
6.0), while applying the best-takes-over and the Fermi-rule strategy
update rules. The smallest pair-wise correlation was 0.72 for the
small temptation values and 0.70 for the large temptation values.
These results indicate that while the game settings do have effects
on the individual game-centrality values, GC may also be used for
a rough comparison of node importance to break cooperation
using different game conditions.
Game Centrality Identifies Functionally Important
Segments of Protein Structures
Next, we extended the use of the game centrality to another
important biological network, the protein structure network,
where the nodes are amino acids, and the edges between them
represent chemical bonds [6,45,46]. We analyzed the protein
structure network of the Escherichia coli methionyl-tRNA synthetase
protein, for which an elegant study [46] showed the existence of
several alternative intra-protein signal transduction pathways.
These signaling paths span a large distance between the active
centre and the anticodon binding region of this enzyme
transmitting the allosteric conformational changes induced by
substrate binding. The methionyl-tRNA synthetase protein has
two major domains, the catalytic domain (responsible for the
activation of methionine) and the tRNA anticodon-binding
domain. These two domains are connected by the connecting
peptide (CP) domain. The catalytic domain can be subdivided to
three sub-domains, having two Rossmann-folds and a stem contact
fold [46].
First, we compared the game centrality (GC) of the amino acids
in the two major domains and their connecting peptide. The
average GC values of both major domains were higher (both
before and after substrate binding) than that of the connecting
peptide domain (Table 3, Figure 2). In agreement with their
central role in protein function, the average GC of intra-protein
signaling amino acids as defined by Ghosh and Vishveshwara [46]
was especially high, if compared to GC-s of the rest of the amino
NetworGame: Node Influence to Break Cooperation
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acids (Table 3). Substrate binding induced a decrease of GC of
most domains, which is in agreement with the development of a
more compact structure, where amino acids may indeed have a
lower individual influence on domain-level processes. GC differ-
ences between the open and closed conformations reflected that
substrate binding affected most the tRNA anticodon domain and
the core of the catalytic domain (the first Rossmann-fold domain;
Table 3, Figure 2), which is again in agreement with the high
increase of compactness around the tRNA and substrate binding
pockets upon substrate binding. These findings are also in
agreement with the prominent influence of binding sites on the
cooperating network of amino acids revealed by molecular
dynamics simulations [47].
In conclusion, game centrality values observed in prisoner’s
dilemma games of individual amino acids of protein structure
networks highlighted the importance of core protein domains,
especially the tRNA anticodon binding domain, the active centre
and intra-protein signaling amino acids in the maintenance of
cooperation of this complex system.
Discussion
In this paper a novel program package, called NetworGame was
introduced to simulate various social dilemma type games with a
high flexibility for payoff conditions, initial parameters, strategies,
strategy update rules and update conditions. We defined a novel
dynamic centrality measure called game centrality (GC), and
showed that it correlates with previous centrality measures, such as
degree, or betwenness centralities. Moreover, GC also predicts
novel influential nodes and network segments, which have a
functional relevance in several social and biological real world
networks.
Although several game simulation tools have been described in
the literature, such as GamePlan [22], Gambit [23], Dynamo [24]
and VirtualLabs/EvoLudo [25], the NetworGame program
package is unique in the sense, that it is able to accept any real-
world networks as an input with the complexity of their weighted
edges. Moreover, the program can handle individual initial
strategies of all networked agents, as well as individual strategy
update rules. The current NetworGame 2.0 version has automat-
ed, statistics-based simulation length and simulation count options,
which were not present in its preliminary NetworGame 1.0 version
mentioned in our former conference report [26]. We note that
NetworGame 2.0 can also be used for simulations having a user-
defined, pre-set number of game rounds.
While game centrality correlated with previous centrality
measures, such as degree and betweenness centrality, it also
predicted novel nodes and centers of large influence, which had
functional relevance both in social and biological real-world
networks. Identification of functionally and dynamically important
network nodes and segments is not an easy field. i.) The
identification of nodes with large and dynamic influence has been
notoriously difficult [29–33,48–50]. ii.) The precise discrimination
between hubs with different dynamic parameters became a subject
of recent discussions [36–43]. iii.) The contribution of individual
proteins to the overall robustness of the cell against evolutionary
changes is a largely unresolved question [44,51,52]. iv.) Though
enzyme active sites and protein binding hot-spots have been
identified using network metrics, such as betweenness centrality,
amino acids of intra-protein signaling are not readily distinguish-
able [53–55]. Game centrality provides a novel and promising
aspect to compare the influence of network nodes and segments
using the cooperation-related, complex dynamic background of
social dilemma games.
Table 1. Game centrality of party hubs, date hubs and randomly selected nodes of a high-fidelity yeast protein-protein interaction
network.
Consensus party hubsb Consensus date hubsb Randomly selected nodesb
Average Game Centrality (GC) of node setsa 0.78960.001c 0.72060.003 0.65860.005
aPrisoner’s dilemma game was simulated using the high-fidelity yeast interactome of Ekman et al. [36], and game centrality measures were calculated as described in
Methods.
bInitially all 2,444 nodes were cooperating except for 30 defecting nodes, which were randomly sampled 2000 times from 63 consensus party hubs (compiled as in [43],
see Table S1 of Text S1), from 145 consensus date hubs (compiled as in [43], see Table S2 of Text S1), as well as from all the 2,444 nodes in the network.
cData represent sample means 6 standard error. The distributions of the game centrality values were significantly different according to the chi-square test (x2.400).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067159.t001
Table 2. Correlations of game centrality (GC) with degree, betweenness centrality and phenotypic potential of proteins in a high
fidelity yeast interactome.
Correlation valuesa Degree Betweenness Centrality Game Centrality (GC)
Degree – 0.8160.02b (p,0.001) 0.6160.04 (p,0.001)
Betweenness Centrality – – 0.6260.04 (p,0.001)
Phenotypic potential 0.0960.04 (p,0.022) 0.0760.04 (p,0.083) 0.1360.05c (p,0.007)
aSimulations of the prisoner’s dilemma game were performed as described in Methods using the parameter set of (R = 3, T = 6, S = 0, P = 1). Correlation values between
degree, betweenness centrality, GC in prisoner’s dilemma game, as well as phenotypic potential [44] were calculated for the 2,444 proteins of the high fidelity yeast
interactome of Ekman et al. [36].
bData represent Goodman-Kruskal’s gamma values 6 standard errors. Significance levels in parentheses were also calculated using Goodman-Kruskal’s gamma test (the
null hypothesis being that the correlation is different from zero).
cUsing the R-package correlation test (http://personality-project.org/r/html/r.test.html, [62]) the correlation between phenotypic potential and game centrality was
significantly larger than the correlation between phenotypic potential and degree, or the correlation between phenotypic potential and betweenness centrality.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067159.t002
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Game centrality values depend on the game model and its
payoff conditions, on the applied strategy update rule, on the
synchronicity of the update, on the network structure as well as on
the number of time steps and total number of simulations. This
makes game centrality a relative measure, and requires an
especially large level of cautiousness in its use, when the level of
final cooperation fluctuates (e.g. in games on square lattice [11],
rock-scissors-paper games [56], etc.). However, the case studies we
made suggest that game centrality values of both individual nodes
and edges (pairs of neighboring nodes) can be useful for the
comparison of influence in the same network when using the
canonical prisoner’s dilemma game on various networks. More-
over, game centrality may be used for the comparison of different
states of the same network, which differ e.g. only in their weight
structure, like that of the yeast protein-protein interaction network
before and after stress [57].
In this paper we calculated game centrality for initially defecting
single nodes or edges (pairs of neighboring nodes) of the network.
However, it is important to note that a similar centrality measure
may also be calculated for the inverse situation, where a pair of
linked nodes is the only initial cooperator in an otherwise defecting
network. Moreover, similar centrality measures may also be
defined for larger segments of nodes, such as for triangles, motifs,
k-cliques, k-clans, k-clubs, k-components, k-plexes, lambda-sets,
network skeletons, rich clubs, network cores, or network commu-
nities [43] using the NetworGame program.
From a different point of view, game centrality indirectly
measures the capability of a node to alter network reciprocity. A
Figure 1. Functional analysis of yeast proteins having the largest game centralities. Prisoner’s dilemma game was simulated on a high-
fidelity yeast interactome [36], and game centrality measures were calculated as described in Methods. 171 proteins out of the 2,444 nodes of the
high-fidelity yeast interactome were selected by selecting nodes, which diminished the cooperation level from ,1 to 0.9 or below. Functional
analysis of the 171 proteins was performed using the Cytoscape plug-in, BiNGO [63] to assess the over-representation of associated Gene Ontology
molecular function terms. Gene Ontology Slim definitions for Saccharomyces cerevisiae [64] were used discarding the evidence codes IEA (inferred
from electronic annotation), ISS (inferred from sequence structural similarity) and NAS (non-traceable author statement). A hypergeometric test with
false discovery rate correction [65] was used to select and visualize the significantly enriched GO functions at a level p,0.001, using the GO-s of the
entire network as reference set. Colors represent functional categories: red, nucleus-related; blue, transport-related; green, signaling-related; yellow
denotes other functions. The size of the circles represents the number of proteins found in the category.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067159.g001
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Figure 2. Game centralities of E. coli methionyl-tRNA synthetase amino acids. The protein structure network of E. coli methionyl-tRNA-
synthetase was constructed, prisoner’s dilemma game was simulated, and game centrality measures were calculated as described in Methods. Game
centralities were overlaid to the 3D image of the protein and tRNA made by the PyMOL program package [66]. tRNAMet is shown in green, the most
influential amino acids spreading defection are marked red (these amino acids have the largest game centrality, GC values) and the least influential
amino acids are blue (having the smallest GC values).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067159.g002









Catalytic domainb 0.69 0.60 0.09
N Rossmann-fold-1(active centre) 0.73 0.56 0.17
N Rossmann-fold-2 0.68 0.62 0.06
N Stem contact fold (KSMKS) 0.65 0.61 0.04
Connecting peptide (CP) domain 0.50 0.36 0.14
tRNA anticodon-binding domain 0.63 0.41 0.22
Signaling amino acids [39] 0.79 0.73 0.06
Complete Met-tRNA-synthetase 0.62 0.47 0.15
aProtein structure network of E coli methionyl-tRNA-synthetase was constructed, Prisoner’s dilemma game was simulated, and game centrality measures were
calculated as described in Methods.
bDomains from top to bottom: the catalytic domain including the Rossmann-fold-1 (catalytic function), Rossmann-fold-2 and stem contact fold (KMSKS) sub-domains;
the connecting peptide (CP) domain; the anticodon binding, carboxy-terminal domain, 43 signaling amino acids involved in the transmission of conformational change
as shown by Ghosh and Vishveshwara [46], whole methionyl-tRNA synthetase.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067159.t003
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highly influential node with large game centrality tends to break
the cooperative islands, the sources of network reciprocity in the
network. In this paper we do not discuss network reciprocity in
detail, but we refer the interested reader to references [58] and
[59].
Currently NetworGame only supports pairwise interactions
between the players. It is an interesting future work to include
group interactions in NetworGame, since it is known [60] that
group interaction can lead to behaviors that cannot be attributed
to the sum of pairwise interactions.
In conclusion, our NetworGame program package proved to be
a useful tool for the analysis of repeated spatial games on real-
world networks, and enabled the definition of a novel game-
related centrality measure called game centrality (GC). Game
centrality correlated with previous centrality measures, such as
degree and betweenness centrality. Moreover, GC also identified
novel, functionally important nodes and network segments in both
social and biological networks. Our work opens the ground for a
number of further studies on the dependence of game centrality of
various parameters of social dilemma games as well as a wide
variety of real world networks including neuronal networks [61].
Game centrality may become a useful measure to identify key
network nodes of various processes of network dynamics, such as
conformational changes, allosteric and cellular signaling, cell
differentiation, cell reprogramming and malignant transformation.
Game centrality may help to design more efficient interventions to
cellular networks (in forms of drugs), to ecosystems or to social
networks.
Methods
Description of the Real World Networks
Zachary’s karate club network. The weighted and undirected social
network of the karate club at a US university contained 34 nodes
and 78 edges described by Wayne Zachary in 1977 [34]. Michael’s
strike network. The social network of a forest product manufacturing
factory contained 24 nodes and 38 edges as described by Judd H.
Michael in 1997 [35]. Yeast protein-protein interaction network. The
giant component of the un-weighted and undirected high-fidelity
yeast protein-protein interaction network [36] contained 2,444
nodes and 6,271 edges, covering approximately half of the yeast
genome and containing the most reliable ,3% of the expected
number of total edges. E. coli methionyl-tRNA synthase protein structure
network. We have constructed the structural network from the 3D
image of the starting (substrate-free) and the equilibrated
(substrate-bound) state of the molecular simulation of the E. coli
methionyl-tRNA synthetase/tRNA/MetAMP complex [46] by
converting the Cartesian coordinates of the 3D image to distances
of amino acid pairs, and keeping all non-covalently bonded
contacts within a distance of 0.4 nm. The final weighted network
was created by removing self-loops, and calculating the inverse of
the average distance between amino acid residues as edge weights.
The protein structure network contained 547 nodes, since the first
3 N-terminal amino acids were not participating in the network.
The protein structure contained 2,164 edges in the substrate-free
network, and 2,153 edges in the substrate-bound network.
Brief Description of the NetworGame Program Package
The NetworGame software is a program that takes a
configuration specification describing the social dilemma game
rules, the model or real world network and other settings, executes
the simulations accordingly, and stores the simulation results. The
simulation engine of the NetworGame program is a highly
optimized software component for running the actual simulation.
The 2.0 version of the NetworGame program is an updated
version of the NetworGame 1.0 version published in a preliminary
conference report [26]. A more detailed description of the
NetworGame program version 2.0 containing the pseudo codes
of its algorithms is found in the (Text S1). Both versions of the
NetworGame program, as well as their User Guides are freely
downloadable from our website: www.linkgroup.hu/
NetworGame.php.
Parameters of Simulations and Calculation of Game
Centrality (GC)
For the analysis of real-world networks we chose the canonical
prisoner’s dilemma game with the payoff parameters R = 3, T = 6,
S = 0, P = 1 (except for Michael’s strike network, where we used
T = 3), since this selection with a maximal temptation (T) value
ensured the largest sensitivity of the initially almost fully
cooperating network to the defection of a single node. In our
simulations edge weights were not used. All simulations used the
widely applied best takes over strategy update rule with a
synchronous update. Simulations of repeated games were halted,
when the mean value of cooperation changed less than 0.01 in the
last 50 rounds. The number of parallel simulations was chosen to
ensure that the mean error for the cooperation level was below
0.01 in the final step. These conditions allowed enough simulations
to get a statistically meaningful mean estimate, and made the
number of simulation steps large enough to surpass the initial
transitional phase often observed in simulations of repeated social
dilemma games. Game centrality (GC) of node i was calculated as
the proportion of defectors averaged over the last 50 simulation
steps, when initially node i was set to defect, while all other nodes
were set to cooperate.
Supporting Information
Text S1 This supporting information (Text S1) contains
a supplementary figure, 2 supplementary tables, a
detailed description of the NetworGame algorithm for
the simulation of spatial social dilemma games with
pseudocodes, as well as 11 supplementary references.
(PDF)
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